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1. Where are we? The need for and contributions of cultural political economy 
 
As 2015 begins, the sense of a world in the midst of multiple overlapping systemic crises remains 
palpable and more intense and foreboding than ever. In critical realist parlance, underlying 
tendencies have erupted into the actual and it seems once again that we are entering a ‘new world’. 
The assassination attacks in Paris, the gruesome beheadings and burnings by ISIS, the election of 
Syriza in Greece with no accommodation still from Germany and the ECB, flagrant political 
executions in Russia and Argentina, tightening clampdowns on free speech in China, another round 
of egregious wrongdoing brought to light in British banks…2 These events feel more than familiar, 
alive somehow with a deeper shifting of social tectonics not present through the period from the 
eruption of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 onwards, that speaks almost of entering a new ‘phase’ 
in the global crises.  
 
What is clear, certainly, is that the present is a moment that is crying out for a new paradigm of 
understanding of political economy, which lies at the source of so many (if not all) of these crises. 
We need a new political economy that is more insightful in its analysis of the present and the 
aetiologies of these various crises, that can incorporate the growing range of issues that (it is 
increasingly clear) are inseparable from issues of political economy (and vice versa) and so that can 
offer more productive ways forward out of the present mess. In short, global crises are calling for 
new knowledge, and a new political economy is a key element of this broader paradigm shift. 
 
                                                 
1 Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster, LA1 4YQ. David Tyfield is Reader in Environmental Innovation and 
Sociology and Director of the International Research & Innovation Centre for the Environment, Guangzhou, China. His 
research focuses on the political economy of research and innovation, especially regarding low-carbon innovation in 
China. 
2 The untimely death of my colleague and friend Ulrich Beck on New Year’s Day – and so soon after that of Roy 
Bhaskar too – has given these events a further, if more personal, hue regarding a new stage in the emergence of a ‘new 
world’ to which both were so insightfully and whole-heartedly dedicated, to the very end, but which it has proven they 
were unable to witness. This essay is dedicated to their memory, with enormous gratitude. 
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Step forward the broad field of ‘cultural political economy’, therefore, which in various 
incarnations has begun amongst the most important of theoretical syntheses underlying such a 
project; namely between a (largely critical and Marx-inspired) political economy and a ‘cultural’ 
realm of hermeneutics, meaning, language, communication etc… Inspired by a variety of specific 
problematics – including the immanent criticism of evident gaps in explanatory power, 
phenomenologically compelling description or political correctness of existing approaches – and 
starting from at least the late 1990s, cultural political economy has developed just in time to be 
ready-to-hand for precisely this moment of crisis understanding and crisis-induced-demands for 
new knowledge. If in every crisis there is opportunity, is this the moment for cultural political 
economy? 
 
This review makes no claim to be surveying the whole field, but we do consider two leading 
candidates within the field: the pragmatist ‘sociology of criticism’ of Luc Boltanski and Eve 
Chiapello, most influentially developed (notably before the emergence of the global crises) in their 
best-selling work ‘New Spirit of Capitalism’; 3  and the ‘cultural political economy’ (CPE - 
henceforth this acronym refers specifically to this work) of Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop. 
Specifically, we consider the post-crisis reflections and responses to the former in Paul Du Gay and 
Glenn Morgan’s edited volume ‘New Spirits of Capitalism?’ (NScC?); and the substantial 500+ 
page second volume of the CPE project, in which, having gone ‘Beyond the Regulation Approach’ 
in a previous volume,4 its positive formulation is most strongly developed to date, ‘Towards a 
Cultural Political Economy’.5 
 
 
2. Sociology of criticism and critique of cultural political economy 
 
Both volumes, and both projects (not the same thing, as the former volume includes much critical 
commentary) in turn, cover vast intellectual terrain that cannot possibly be faithfully reviewed, no 
matter the length of the essay. We focus here, therefore, only on key strengths and weaknesses in 
both, specifically brought out by reading them together and in the broader context of the current 
conjuncture. 
 
We must start, nevertheless, with a brief description of both projects. For Boltanski & Chiapello the 
cultural political economy project (not a terminology they use incidentally) hails from a 
dissatisfaction with the canons of critical French sociology in which they were schooled, notably 
Bourdieu, specifically regarding the tendency of this work to render the every-day social actor a 
dupe of ‘bigger’ social forces. Turning instead, therefore, to the pragmatics of everyday reasoning, 
they examined how reasoning and argument, and specifically diverse forms of justification, are 
brought to bear in the inescapably inchoate arena of everyday decision-making, marked by an 
irreducible uncertainty. Determined not to lose sight of the broader context of powerful social 
structures, and of ‘capitalism’, however, this shift of perspective is used to explore, in particular, the 
performance of substantive logics of criticism. This is thus a shift from a ‘critical sociology’ to a 
pragmatist ‘sociology of criticism’.  
 
Yet there is also a secondary motivation of this work encountered at this point: namely to explore 
how politically powerful forms of critique of capitalism can be (and have ended up being) absorbed 
by capitalist social forces, or rather utilised as forces of the rejuvenation and relegitimation (always 
only ever temporary) of continued capitalist accumulation. Specifically, these forms of critique are 
said to transform the ‘spirit of capitalism’, drawing on allusions to Weber. Written at the very 
                                                 
3 Boltanski & Chiapello 2007, henceforth NEC. 
4 Jessop & Sum 2006. 
5 Sum & Jessop 2013, henceforth TCPE. 
3 
 
height of a neoliberal social dominance, but before the current crises, NEC describes how the 
countercultural critiques of the 1960s and ‘70s came to inform what emerged subsequently as the 
dominant management discourses of the 1980s and ‘90s, in a classic example of an anti-capitalist-
critique-turned-capitalist-manifesto. Though translated into English only much later, the book 
received enormous adulation from the Left-leaning social sciences. As regards the present, then, Du 
Gay and Morgan’s edited volume brings together work inspired and/or critical of NEC, including 
from both original authors (itself both inspired by and critical of NEC), with the invitation to think 
through how this perspective illuminates the present crises of neoliberalism.  
 
For Sum & Jessop, by contrast, CPE is understood as a project firmly within a ‘critical social 
science’ - and explicitly critical realist - frame, but seeking to grapple with the significant opening 
of the theoretical imagination that decades of post-structuralist but not-Marx-incompatible criticism 
of political economy have wrought. Here, then, the explanatory starting point concerns the 
predicament of the enquiring intellect as it confronts a reality that is always too complicated, 
complex and variegated to capture faithfully in understanding. The result is the imperative of 
simplification, always done from the specifically situated perspective of a given agent, and where 
the resulting construal is as much a reflection of that agent’s strategic goals, positioning and 
resources as of their knowledge.  
 
‘Some construals are more equal than others’,6 however, in that, depending on one’s strategically 
enabled or constrained positioning, construals can be more or less successfully (but never 
completely) transformed into social constructions by way of an evolutionary process involving 
social variegation, selection and retention. This thus sets up a social ontological overview from 
which it follows that all apparently ‘material’ processes are mediated and selected by way of these 
irreducible semiotic processes, while conversely, the latter are always mediated and constrained by 
the former. In short, therefore, this is a strategic and relational perspective in which moments of 
‘hard’ political economy and ‘soft’ semiosis/ economic sociology must be analytically separated 
and never collapsed on each other, but equally must be explored in their conjunction. In other 
words, the challenge of CPE (thus defined) is to chart a course ‘between Scylla and Charybdis’,7 
thereby illuminating the mutual ontological interplay of political economy and semiosis in the 
active and strategic emergence of cultural political economic settlements. 
 
Jumping from this most abstract to a more concrete ‘meso’ level, then, the project takes shape in 
terms of exploring specifically how forms of semiosis and particular conjunctions of political 
economic (capitalist) relations have intercalated in the construction and crises of these hegemonic 
forms, drawing on methodologies of critical discourse analysis for the former and critical/Marxist 
post-regulation approach political economy for the latter; or in other terminology a synthesis of 
‘Foucault’ and ‘Gramsci’, that privileges the emancipatory and critical social science thrust of the 
latter over the former. 
 
Reading the two books together, it is indeed striking how complementary they are in many ways, 
even as their points of common reference, let alone direct and explicit cross-referencing of each 
other, are slight. Both approaches yield considerable insights, engender highly sophisticated, 
meticulous and politically- or morally-earnest (a compliment!) bodies of work that speak of intense 
care for their subjects and for the potential contribution of their work to broader social and political 
projects of human ‘betterment’.  
 
They are also strikingly similar in many concrete respects. Most obviously, both are explicit 
attempts at synthesis between approaches that take seriously, and on their own terms, the concerns 
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of (broadly defined) critical political economy and (broadly defined) ‘culture’, albeit each with 
opposite polarities. Hence for Boltanksi & Chiapello the priority is a pragmatist sociology of forms 
of critical reasoning that nevertheless does not lose touch with the contexts of capitalism, albeit read 
in post-Marxist terms; while for Sum & Jessop the priority is a revived critical social science based 
in Marxist (critique of) political economy, where this revitalisation happens precisely by taking 
seriously the diversity of concrete forms capitalism can take by incorporating semiosis into the heart 
of its analytical form. For both, therefore, a stand-out point of contact is French Regulation theory, 
and the key point that (ever-expanding) capitalist relations necessarily stand in permanent need of 
ever-renewed discourses of legitimation or else face system-wide rejection and consequent systemic 
crisis. 
 
As such, however, both projects are also similar at the more abstract level of philosophical projects; 
and, indeed, it is also noticeable how strongly both projects explicitly deal with issues across both 
the substantive level of their empirical research and primary social concern and this more abstract 
level. In particular, both are clearly projects attempting the broader synthesis of a critical realism 
and a post-structuralist pragmatism, and thus, crucially, motivated by a felt need for this synthesis 
and a broad awareness of their being significant explanatory and/or ‘emancipatory’ loss in choosing 
only one such approach at the cost of total neglect of the other. For this reviewer, such an 
acknowledgement of the value of the ‘other’ approach, whichever one is ‘starting’ from, seems 
utterly appropriate - indeed, a pre-requisite today of any intellectual project in this field worth 
seriously entertaining. For if we are interested in how contemporary political economies, of 
“knowledge societies” especially, work we must attend to both their dominant framing by 
(structures of) relations of capitalist accumulation AND to the construction of new (techno-
scientific) knowledges through which this process is mediated. 8 The former calls for a critical 
realist approach, while a post-structuralist and constructivist approach has proven undeniably 
productive in deepening our understanding of the latter; concerns at the meso-level conditioning 
demands at the philosophical one. 
 
This is clear in both projects and manifest from their own starting points. Hence, for Boltanski & 
Chiapello, a pragmatist approach is what offers insightful illumination into the actual processes and 
negotiations that people actually (have) go(ne) through in the fundamentally open, and always only 
ever temporary, construction of edifices of logics of justification - not getting the ‘right answer’ but 
constructing ways and means through which life can ‘go on’ ‘acceptably’. But today this is also and 
irreducibly life conditioned by the imperative of capitalist accumulation; and taking this into 
account demands at least some concession that this compulsive force is ‘real’ in some way - and, 
moreover, problematic. At the very least, therefore, a critical realism must have some presence in 
the Boltanski & Chiapello framework, however tacit and/or attenuated.  
 
Conversely, for Sum & Jessop, their primary critical realist orientation manifests in their 
prioritisation of renewing the critique of political economy - but where the raison d’être of their 
specific project comes from the acknowledgement that the concrete twists and turns, and always 
temporary geo-historical settlements and fixes of capitalist accumulation, can only be understood by 
attending also to the issue of semiosis. 
 
The two projects/volumes also are both crammed with insights, from the ‘grand theoretical’ (a term 
explicitly and very productively developed by Sum & Jessop) to the detailed. For this reviewer, 
however, three stood out especially: from Sum & Jessop, the broader conception of complex 
strategic relational systems in which political economy and semiosis, ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, are 
situated and indissolubly connected; from the Du Gay & Morgan volume, and particularly in the 
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chapters from Du Gay himself, the (for this reviewer) surprising significance of a reappraisal of 
Weber, rather than Marx or Polanyi, as the ‘canonical’ social theorist offering the most relevant 
insights into our current predicament; and, from Boltanski & Chiapello and reappraisals thereof, 
regarding the crucial work that anti-capitalist critique, and hence critical social science itself, does 
for the rejuvenation of capitalism (a matter of some heated controversy, as we shall see). 
 
Indeed, across all three of these major points there appears to be something of a common thread, 
namely in the recognised imperative for particular attention to the inescapable limits of knowledge, 
its incompleteness and imperfectibility, what it can achieve, the extent to which it can possibly be 
‘objective’ and per se ‘truthful’, etc… In short regarding the epistemological challenges posed by 
the immanent scientific study of science itself, by way of science & technology studies and/or the 
curiously (but tellingly) absent (or at least under-represented) figure of Foucault. Thus, Sum & 
Jessop’s work is, it seems, primarily motivated by the political implications and insights from this 
work for critical social science and its social ontology, viz. ‘how is the (social) world really 
structured?’, presenting the results of this attempted theoretical integration. Du Gay’s work in his 
jointly edited volume, meanwhile, draws on Weber to present a compelling critique of the dominant 
social epistemology of neoliberalism and its hugely destructive market-individualist Promethean 
optimism regarding the supposed capacity of the entrepreneurial self to remake the world as it 
wishes, with a specific focus on the costs for states and their bureaucracies. Here, then, a small-c 
conservative valuing of norms of ‘public service’ is presented as the corollary of a eupeptic 
scepticism regarding the capacity of individual knowers acting through untrammelled 
entrepreneurial self-interest to be able to manage issues of government effectively, and indeed, not 
disastrously, corruptly and/or destructively. Finally, Boltanski & Chiapello (and some, but not all, 
of the pieces in the Du Gay & Morgan volume) take up the challenges for the conception of critical 
social science itself, and its emancipatory thrust and self-definition, from the growing weight of 
evidence, in the literature and in historical experience, that knowledge does not, and more to the 
point cannot, play the role assigned to it by this epistemic-political project. For the inseparability 
and co-production of strategic power and new forms of knowledge effectively means that the task 
of perfecting critical social knowledge does not in fact offer what it claims – as a necessary if not 
sufficient step – regarding either its emancipatory ‘essence’ nor actual socio-political effect. 
 
Read together, therefore, it emerges that the volumes are presenting different perspectives and 
aspects of a broader ontological-epistemological programme (if not actually ‘achieved’ synthesis). 
This reviewer understands this aggregation of insights in terms of a complex systems perspective, 
where the ‘stuff of the world’ not only is constituted as such complex (in the sense of non-linear and 
emergent, not merely ‘complicated’) and dynamic relational systems (and systems of systems) but 
also and specifically as intrinsically strategic, a-rational and normatively ambivalent 
power/knowledge relations and technologies that in turn condition further agency and emergence; 
and this includes the practices and institutions of knowledge production, ‘politics’ and government 
(in the broad Foucauldian sense). This seems to me to be a conception that is both epistemically 
compelling (affording significant critical explanatory power and insights of genealogical criticism) 
and strategically enabling, and the most promising outlines of an emerging reshaping of political 
economy and the social sciences more generally for the challenges of the 21st century. Moreover, in 
both cases, their evident ethical seriousness shines through not just in terms of the profundity and 
rigorousness of their respective analyses but also in what is evidently the primary motivation for 
both projects – namely to contribute not just to the accumulation of knowledge and ‘cleverness’ but 
to more just and equitable worlds. In short, both projects warrant considerable support and 
development. The rest of this essay will consider one argument as to how best to do this. 
 
 




As is clear from these different ways in which the irreducibly strategic and power relational nature 
of knowledge is incorporated in these various projects, however, the projects are also strikingly 
different in key respects - and, indeed, even opposing or complementary (depending on one’s 
perspective). Moreover, these differences serve to highlight shortcomings in each, weaknesses and 
gaps addressed in the other, at least to a greater extent. And more importantly still, this comparison 
brings out problems shared across the projects, whereby the complementary insight of the ‘other’ 
remains less than a full and comprehensive response. 
 
In particular, what emerges clearly from reading the two against each other is how their respective 
engagements with the insights of the limits of knowledge and its strategic nature are less than 
whole-hearted, but rather attempts to domesticate it in some ways according to the existing 
strictures and demands of the position already adopted. In particular, neither project sufficiently 
engages with the significance of power/knowledge for their own projects as opposed to as another, 
albeit key, insight that needs to be incorporated into the picture they paint of the world they are 
studying. Yet, precisely as self-consciously self-defined epistemic-political projects, where 
power/knowledge is genuinely acknowledged, both projects simply cannot go on as before.  
 
This is true of self-consciously ‘critical’ (realist) and ‘pragmatist’ projects alike, the two registers of 
epistemic critical analysis, as the two perfectly exemplify. Whether the goal is to construct critical 
and realist explanations that enable emancipatory insight into the exploitative nature of capitalism, 
as contingent natural necessities, or to present deconstructive and deflating rich descriptions of the 
always-imperfectly negotiated challenges of everyday meaning-making in the context of political 
economic systems dependent upon constantly performed and renewed logics of justification; in both 
cases, acknowledging power/knowledge robs the analyst (and their readers) of any consolation that 
the epistemic work in itself will have the desired ‘emancipatory’ or ‘disillusioning’ effect. As such, 
power/knowledge demands that all epistemic projects, actively and in practice, seek their value and 
purpose outside and beyond themselves, and specifically by explicitly addressing and returning to 
the key strategic question - situated as we all are amidst complex, dynamic structures of 
power/knowledge relations - of ‘what do I do now?’ 
 
When tested against this key question, however, it unfortunately appears that neither Boltanski & 
Chiapello’s pragmatism (nor Boltanski’s, again highly insightful, self-critical developments of his 
approach) nor Sum & Jessop’s critical realism actually present much in the way of compelling 
answers to this question. In the former case, as several critical pieces in the NSsC? volume argue 
persuasively,9 the attempt to synthesise a pragmatist sociology of criticism with the specific issues 
of the logics of justification of capitalism has, if anything, almost the opposite to the desired effect. 
The stand-out lesson of NEC seems to be that effectively all forms of anti-capitalist critical 
argument end up merely being absorbed by and reviving capitalism. This is thus a counsel of 
despair, as well as an unwarranted presentation of capitalism as monolithic, infinitely flexible and, 
of course, unbeatable. In seeking to take capitalism seriously in its revival of a critical pragmatist 
sociology, therefore, this synthesis of (philosophical and meso-level) perspectives ends up actually 
achieving the opposite. “What do I do now?” thus can elicit only the thin gruel of ‘formulate new 
critiques, but in full awareness they will serve capitalism better than the critical movement itself’.  
 
Conversely, for Sum & Jessop, one would expect to look specifically in the more substantive and 
meso- level analyses both of crises’ aetiologies and learning in, by and from crises per se 
(fascinating work, to be sure) and the illustrative CDA analyses of specific discursive-material 
conjunctures of the present for some advice regarding ‘what next?’ Yet the analytical gaze remains 
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firmly post hoc and explanatory in both cases, and indeed, sometimes denunciatory in tone rather 
than strictly critical in ways that – all statements to contrary notwithstanding – give the strong 
impression that this form of critique of capitalism – as opposed to a Marxian critique of political 
economy without the specific focus on semiosis and critical discourse analysis – sometimes takes a 
circular form of showing that a discourse or phenomenon presumed from the outset as bad is indeed 
bad. Again, therefore, the attempt to synthesize critical insights from the ‘other’ perspective end up 
paradoxically weakening, not strengthening, the critical thrust of the original position. To be sure, 
these chapters almost all end with valid and important comments regarding the intrinsically 
unclose-able nature of capitalist settlements, the capillary nature of power and the omnipresent 
possibility of resistance and counter-hegemony. But these abstract consolations are surely not 
enough, even notwithstanding the enormity of the volume and what it does meticulously, effortfully 
achieve. What is thus lacking, therefore, is attention to the inevitably messy and even sometimes 
morally ambiguous challenges and decisions of generating new knowledge of the world presented 
‘here’ and ‘now’ to us – us all, both critical social scientists and everyday agents, including the 
explicitly pro-capitalist agents under investigation – as a primarily strategic and not epistemic 
challenge, in which power/knowledge is not a matter of concealing a truth but rather an inescapable 
predicament of trying to construct the emerging socio-political (and -natural) future in specific 
ways.  
 
In both cases, therefore, these projects remain, in their own practice and implicit in their explicit 
goals of ‘getting the answer right’ about their chosen subject matter – substantively and/or 
theoretically, with all the sophistication on display in both cases –, wedded to a dualistic conception 
of knowledge vs. action-in-the-world that their discussion of power/knowledge goes beyond.  The 
result, however,  is that their laudable commitment to scholarship that aims to contribute to political 
programmes of social betterment can only be manifest in terms of what their knowledge contributes 
to the illumination of such a larger movement, i.e. as assessed on strictly epistemic criteria.  
Conceived on such terms, though, the most such epistemic projects can offer is to change the distal 
goal for which one is aiming to ‘get the answer right’, vis-à-vis from a positivist ‘for itself’ to a 
much broader critical gaze ‘for human emancipation’.  What cannot be changed – and is not 
changed in these cases –, however, is the (self-) conception of epistemic projects per se as the 
progressive perfecting of knowledge and understanding; albeit perhaps self-consciously as fallible, 
iterative, never-ending and/or asymptotic approaches on ‘truth’, and as merely one step, but a 
necessary one, toward realization of their distal goal.   In short, understanding the truth – or perhaps 
merely determinate negation of the socially-efficacious demi-real untruth – is conceived as a 
necessary, discrete and first step in an emancipatory project, for it then to be put into action and 
realized in various ways.  And this separation is presupposed by all ‘critical’ projects, or else one is 
forced to abandon the possibility of realizing – at least, in cognitive understanding and in the first 
instance, then to be realized in practice and/or actuality – (a) truth that is per se emancipatory, 
which is the very mark of ‘critical’ social science.  
 
Moreover, the specific problems both encounter arise directly from their continued attempt to base 
their synthesis of critical realist and pragmatist insights on primarily epistemic projects. For such a 
synthesis cannot work when thus framed. This could be explained in terms of the ontological 
natures of the epistemic resources that are, thus, their primary materials (a critical realist point, 
dependent upon being able to make such ‘realist’ statements). For, as alluded above, forms of 
political and substantive insight condition acceptable and appropriate forms of presupposed 
epistemological approach and these requirements mean that, insofar as they remain conducted at a 
purely epistemic level as de facto epistemic enterprises, ‘synthesis’ is an attempt to merge two 
essentially different perspectives. The result, thus, can only be the subsumption of one by the other, 
to the likely effect of violence on and distortion of both. Hence the more successful and 
sophisticated the epistemic-level synthesis of pragmatist (NB ≠ pragmatic) and critical realist 
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analyses, the bigger (and not as we may suppose when embarking on such a synthesis, the lesser) 
the problems, as we have seen. 
 
In the case of Boltanski & Chiapello, this manifests in the combination of a pragmatist flat-ontology 
analysis of the actual logics of justification of capitalism, but one which, thereby identifying 
primarily with its epistemic position, self-consciously takes capitalism as given and unquestionable. 
The result is a critical project, seeking to rethink and re-energize emancipation, that ends in 
defeatism. Conversely, for Sum & Jessop the determination to incorporate all the insights regarding 
the strategic nature and limits of knowledge back into a grand theoretical overview with primarily 
critical explanatory aims necessarily leads only to a framework of increasing - daunting, even - 
sophistication and nuance, while focusing studiously on critical insights regarding the extent of the 
iniquity of and power asymmetries underlying contemporary social change rather than on strategic 
insights regarding what can be done about it. 
 
What is key here, though, is that these criticisms arise precisely from the insights the two projects 
(and their reading together) provide. In short, the very complex strategic relational and productive 
power perspective that both are seeking to grapple with presents a challenge that is not only akin to 
an immanent critique of both positions, but is also one that is specifically challenging – indeed 
intensifying – at present. As regards the former, where the whole (socio-natural) world is a dynamic 
and complex systemic process in which strategic power/knowledge relations (and the 
power/knowledge technologies mediating and mediated by them) are primary loci and mediations 
of socio-technical and political change, it follows immediately that: 
 
(i) this is an irreducible predicament of all enterprises and agents;  
(ii) that the nature of this positioning is that, positively, strategic world-producing action and 
practice is an unshakeable imperative on everyone, while, negatively, the irreducible non-closure of 
the complex system realities, their relentless and unstoppable dynamism and the priority of the 
‘realrationalität’ of relational power over the ‘rationalität’ of the (critical) intellect10 mean that the 
project of seeking to improve (social) reality, moving it in the ‘right direction’ by way of the 
‘necessary’ first step of critical understanding and elucidation of cognizable truths that are per se 
emancipatory, must be abandoned;  
(iii) that this includes the ontological reality of knowledge (practices) too, which emerge and make 
sense (attain intelligibility and purchase) only when thus positioned as strategic power/knowledge 
enterprises of greater or lesser truth-constructing success. Hence these too are (radically) 
imperfectible, but intelligible in both their opening and their ‘closing’ only in the context of 
strategic projects and to be evaluated primarily in terms of their strategic world-building effects, not 
in their own terms of rational coherence etc…(what may be called a ‘strategic realism’);  
(iv) that therefore, against projects even aspiring to self-substantiality and totalized closure as some 
distant ideal, there is no possibility of ever getting (social) reality ‘right’ – to align it with ‘truth’ –, 
even asymptotically or approximately, through the relentless effort and untiring vigilance of the 
critical intellect. 
 
In short, and to repeat, precisely the ontological insights that have been yielded to date by the 
imaginative synthesis of the critical insights of pragmatist and critical realist work lead to an 
ontology and associated epistemology that cannot but significantly and conclusively deflate the 
pretensions of the critical intellect and its ambitions for (conclusively informing) world-righting 
socio-political action. For it becomes painfully (or perhaps liberatingly) clear from this ontological 
perspective that the critical intellect – of both stripes, pragmatist and critical realist – is, on its own 
terms, at best deluded (and so misleading) as to its own importance in projects of the human quest 
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for freedom from suffering.  Conversely, situated within a power/knowledge perspective, it may 
become a useful strategic instrument in never-ending projects of world-building. But here, the 
priority of the question ‘what do I do now?’, or more specifically, ‘what strategic action does this 
analysis illuminate?’, can be seen anew and as even more pressing, being the primary question for 
knowledge, including critical knowledge. This thus initiates a shift in approach to one of phronesis 
or situated power/knowledge-aware practical wisdom, in which both the power/knowledge 
attentiveness and associated dynamic relationality and the prioritization of strategic, practical 
intervention warrant emphasis.11  
 
To be sure, both critical pragmatist deconstruction or disillusionment and critical realist explanatory 
insight can significantly contribute to any such project, i.e. can serve precisely as key sources of 
strategic insight and strategic advantage. But this strategic contribution is not a secondary matter, as 
each would tend to see it vis-à-vis their epistemic-political illumination of socio-political ‘truths’, 
but their primary value. And they will be of much greater strategic value the more they are 
explicitly framed as such; while, vice versa, failing to be thus reframed may serve significantly to 
reduce their strategic, and indeed thereby even their epistemic, value. In short, putting the critical 
intellect ‘in its place’, to misquote Sum & Jessop, seems a much more appropriate and far-reaching 
conclusion than simply doing so with ‘culture’.  
 
 
4. What do I do NOW? 
 
So much, then, for the ‘immanent’ criticism. But what makes this point even more crucial and 
pressing, if not frankly undodgeable – and note, on strategic grounds, i.e. now, in this specific 
socio-historical juncture, in terms of what cultural political economy needs strategically to be doing 
etc… – is that strategic insight is specifically crucial in moments of systemic crisis and transition. In 
other words, in moments when the very constitution of entire social systems are in the process of 
profound qualitative change, it is savvy (and preferably ethical or ‘virtuous’!) strategic action that 
will succeed in dominating the shaping of the emerging system. Of course, this is precisely such a 
moment. But in such moments, the critical, post hoc intellect (whether explanatory or 
deconstructive) and its firmly backward-facing and rational-critical gaze is not just looking 
elsewhere; far worse than this, it is claiming for itself the moniker of politically engaged epistemic 
project while systematically refusing to engage in any strategic (including strategic-epistemic) 
action that has any hope of capitalizing upon this moment of intense opportunity and profound 
opening, or even of strategically girding and guiding ethical forces through the destructive 
whirlwinds of the crises.  
 
As such, to the extent it engages with issues of present political direction, the break between post 
hoc explanatory sophistication and an untheorized future-oriented strategic action conditions – or 
rather , lets off the hook – the propagation of ‘arbitrary, rationalistic and willed’ (a great phrase 
from Gramsci, cited by Sum & Jessop) visions of ‘alternatives’ (see e.g., disappointingly, much of 
the ‘degrowth’ literature).  Moreover and much worse, as such it also wilfully concedes the strategic 
battlefield.  For other social forces will have significantly less qualms about rational or normative 
coherence, and will be enabled as such. And in contexts in which ‘common-sense’ remains utterly 
conditioned by logics of capitalist individualism, these other social forces will be likewise 
systematically conditioned by understandings of the world that are far indeed from the insights of a 
                                                 
11 Flyvbjerg et al. 2013.  I note (with thanks to Mervyn Hartwig) that Bhaskar (2008) thematises ‘phronesis’ in 
Dialectic.  This is not the place to compare these discussions.  But the development of the term by Flyvbjerg and 
colleagues remains significantly different to Bhaskar’s use of the term – and in ways that again resonate with the 
difference between projects prioritizing building edifices of understanding as against projects focused primarily on 
strategic intervention, as discussed here.  
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critical analysis of capitalism. In these circumstances, then, self-consciously limiting themselves to 
critical illumination of the (recent) past is not merely rationally self-defeating but normatively and 
politically wrong, systematically offering no strategic guidance for such mobilization at the very 
moment of its greatest need and most profound opportunity. While certainly not the case for the 
books under review, it also too easy when focused on a (difficult, laborious, protracted) project of 
critical explanatory knowledge – as I know myself with discomfort – to become fascinated by the 
promises of the critical intellect as an enterprise that in itself supposedly fulfils one’s political 
responsibilities, as if illumination in itself will ‘emancipate’.  
 
To emphasise this point, let us briefly consider how (an emphasis on) critical and ‘complex’ 
explanation can be a positive impediment, a problem, and is not always what (critical, political-) 
epistemic projects should be primarily dedicated to developing. A vivid example of this for me 
arose at the beginning of this year, in the wake of the Paris murder rampage. This was, 
understandably, immediately followed in the mainstream press-cum-social media by the charge and 
counter-charge of the extent to which the assault was indicative of a broader incompatibility 
between Islam per se and Western liberal democratic freedom of speech, and the extent to which all 
Muslims should or should not be held in some way responsible for the killings. Of course, this in 
turn elicited statements from Muslim voices condemning the killings and denouncing any 
connection between them and Islam, affirming the latter as a religion of peace. Others, perhaps 
carefully making the distinction between explanation and justification, pointed also to the 
continuing killings, on much greater scale, of (perhaps fellow) Muslims across west and central 
Asia by Western governments. Cutting through all this discussion, then, the Guardian’s Gary 
Younge wrote a strong piece about the need for a more complex explanation to get to grips with the 
source and meaning of the killings. 12  He unimpeachably pointed out the utter failure of all 
explanations presented in clear black-and-white terms properly to come to grips with what, in 
effectively critical realist terms, is the underlying reality that the events reveal and to which we now 
must respond. More importantly, he argued that only such a complex explanation can avoid pouring 
further fuel onto the fires of hatred, extremist fundamentalism and mistrust in cycles of 
recrimination and counter-blame.  
 
So far, so good. But what the Paris killings and the popular response also show is that critical 
explanation of events, no matter how complex, also misses a great deal – both epistemically, as a 
matter of referential fidelity, and politically – and in ways that are now of such consequence that 
they must be addressed. In particular, the underlying premise of calls for ‘more complex 
explanation’ is generally an appeal to calm reason and a return to our senses, even if this means 
confronting uncomfortable truths on all sides. This is a sensible move. In 2001, for instance, after 
9/11 it was clear that the voices ramping up the analysis of the attacks into a ‘clash of civilizations’ 
and an ‘axis of evil’ were precisely engaged in self-serving and self-legitimizing rhetorical projects 
that could only serve to exacerbate the situation: precisely the goal for war-mongering neo-
conservatives, for instance, but also, to a great many others, manifestly self-defeating in terms of 
accepting the terms of the engagement with (what we then called) Al Qaeda that they presented. Far 
better all round to have a ‘complex explanation’ of the situation and then engage with a group who 
have styled themselves ‘our’ enemy on ‘our’ terms, while preserving the rights of Muslims in our 
countries and harmonious inter-cultural relations.  
 
In 2015, however, now half a generation into a ‘global war on terror’ seemingly without end and, to 
the contrary, one that is mutating and radicalizing, such calls for calm reason seem not only 
increasingly hollow, themselves ringing fraught and desperate, but also actively fail to engage with 
the extent to which the (real!) strategic landscape of public mood has changed in the interim and 
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now is no longer prepped and ready for ‘calm reasoning’ but rather for fearful and/or defiant 
confrontation. Moreover, in these circumstances, calls for ‘complex explanation’ – insofar as it is 
per se presented as the acme of the reasonable political way forward – will not only fall on 
increasingly deaf ears (like calling for calm in a stampede), but, given this changed real context, 
legitimately and rationally so (again like ignoring the call for calm in a stampede and running for 
your life). For the very preconditions of critical explanation as the necessary and primary 
contribution of ‘thought’ to progressive political praxis no longer hold: notably a relative stability in 
socio-political and every-day life and the roles and forms of knowledge, reasoning and cultural 
meaning in that system; a diminution of the role played by strong popular emotion, bullet-headed 
defiance etc.. in the (again, real) trajectory of social change, precisely because new forms of 
reasoning have emerged that are (perhaps increasingly) capable of ‘normal’ government and crisis 
management; and hence a basis for how knowledge reflecting critically on itself can both make 
genuine political contributions and, mistakenly but persuasively, increasingly see itself as politics.  
 
Conversely, in moments not of relative systemic (meta-)stability but of active, ongoing and 
profound change, it is clear that the primary political question is not ‘why has this happened?’ so we 
can hold the political system to account and seek to change it, but the much more challenging, 
productive and Dionysian question of ‘what system can be forged from this conjuncture and how?’ 
In short, in such moments the systemic dependence of the legitimacy of given forms of epistemic 
criteria for rational thought on ontologically prior, but generally tacitly presupposed, strategic and 
world-productive-power-relational concerns becomes inescapable because the socio-political 
stability on which the pretences of (critical) reason as politics are collapsing. 
 
To be sure, where explicitly reframed as a necessary moment in a broader strategic project (of 
‘what do I do now, given this predicament?’), critical explanation remains essential; one must 
certainly still not lose one’s head even as you run with that proverbial stampede, as much remains at 
stake and possible in terms of better or worse concrete outcomes. But note how its legitimacy, both 
epistemic and political, hinges on its strategic contribution and not primarily (let alone entirely) on 
its own criteria of evaluation (viz. explanatory power etc…). This is so even as the opposite 
continues to hold, viz. its strategic contribution is in part a matter of its explanatory power; but 
‘here’ and ‘now’ to ‘these’ people facing ‘this’ predicament, not objectively and in itself. In short, 
without this radical reframing, the contribution(s) of the critical intellect are actually wrong. 
 
Moreover, were this not enough, the current system crisis – or more properly overlapping crises of 
systems and system of systems and of their crisis management13 – means that, quite literally, the 
whole world is at stake as never before. Whether expressed in discourses of planetary boundaries, 
Anthropocene, cosmopolitization and global risk society, imminent post-human singularity etc… it 
is manifestly clear that the challenge that we (and cultural political economies) are faced with – 
now, here – is not just one of political economic, or even political economic-cum-cultural political, 
crisis (on many different scales, global, regional, national, local…); but one also of ‘nature’ and of 
planetary extent, or more accurately of the prevailing socio-natural relations, including especially 
the forms of power/knowledge technologies through which they are mediated and their innovation. 
Acknowledging this – and again in practice, in a way that incorporates this into the core of the 
problematic to be worked with – however, again demands that the critical intellect simply holds up 
its hands in defeat, at least insofar as it continues to demand for itself the pre-eminent epistemic 
contribution to progressive political projects. For whether it is the complexity of socio-natural 
relations, and their global-local diversity, or the complexity of the geographical specificity and 
cosmopolitized hybridity of socio-economies and their distinctive forms of knowledge and 
innovation, it is clear that the ‘world’ the critical intellect is now trying to encompass massively 
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exceeds its capacities. Moreover, it is clear that the predicament we are faced with is one in which 
we must take responsibility for the ‘world’ even as we have no chance of coming anywhere close to 
‘fully’ understanding it – not beforehand, not now, not ever.  Knowledge, in short, cannot and will 
not deliver emancipation, and this includes critical knowledge that is explicitly oriented beyond 
itself to projects of praxis that are in turn oriented to concrete ends apparently illuminated by critical 
knowledge. 
 
How, then, can the critical intellect respond to this predicament?  The most productive route is for it 
to concede defeat of a kind and allow other conceptions to emerge that resituate and depose it from 
its self-appointed throne.  For this can yet re-dignify the critical intellect with a diminished but 
crucial role in a broader project of ‘meliorist’ social and personal practice. In short, the ‘problem 
field’ that contemporary progressive politics is confronted with is one in which the very discourse 
of emancipation by way of a necessary step of critical knowledge (whether critical realist or 
pragmatist) must not only be abandoned as not fit for purpose, but is a positive impediment that 
must be shed.  
 
5. So…what DO I do now? 
Of course, to avoid being hoist by my own petard, it is incumbent upon me now to present some 
response to precisely the key question I have outlined. What is to be done, then? What strategically 
in this moment is a ‘way forward’? And whence these alternative conceptions? 
 
In this (not so!) brief review, it is not possible for me to summarize clearly my own response, 
though this is a project I am in the process of completing elsewhere. What follows is thus a potted 
summary of the fuller argument to come.14 But a few key points can certainly be made here. 
 
First, regarding the new role of science, including critical social science, I can do no better than 
Büscher’s succint summary of this point, thus:  
 
“A deeper understanding and conceptualisation of complex dynamic systems is not enough. 
Indeed, it is problematic to assume that 'real' understanding and ‘diagnosis’ is a possible and 
necessary precondition for acting in and on such systems in ways that can help people 'design' 
them better. Science, technology, natural, material, economic processes, human practice are 
distributed, mobile, entangled, emergent phenomena. Rather than assume that thorough 
'diagnosis' is a precondition for intelligent action in and on such systems it is more useful to 
consider how diagnostic work can be done through and as part of action…. 21st Century 
scientists need to be able to mobilise knowledge for intelligent, circumspect, prudent action 
on shifting ground. The role of 21st Century scholars should be to help societies to expose 
those who need to understand the system to as far and wide as possible perceptual access to 
the systems' operation and reverberations whilst being embedded in and acting on the 
system.”15 
 
Secondly, in terms of substantive focus of the social sciences, and indeed ‘techno-science’ more 
generally, the broad ontological vision outlined above of dynamic complex power/knowledge 
systems suggests two key points: first, that processes of ‘knowledge production’, research and 
innovation are key windows into the ongoing process of world-making and, crucially, for insights 
regarding what world is currently being – and could be – strategically constituted amidst the ‘world 
crises’.16 Moreover, with its gaze firmly oriented on this explicitly strategic landscape AND seeing 
itself as inescapably within this landscape, this analysis of current and currently-changing 
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knowledge/power technologies must reconceptualize its purpose too as one of working with and 
generating new knowledge/power technologies that serve broader, ‘public’ and ‘knowledge 
democracy’ purposes. 17  A particularly productive line of development in this respect, and for 
critical realist work more generally, is to align with the ‘real social science’ movement and its call 
for a revitalization of phronesis, or situated practical and power-aware strategic wisdom, as the 
primary epistemic virtue, as against both the more familiar forms of episteme and techne.18 In this 
way, therefore, sciences, including critical social science, actively take advantage of the limited but 
not insignificant strategic privileges they have for genuine intervention in politics – a (global and 
local) politics, moreover, in which issues of ‘knowledge’ are increasingly central – rather than 
cleaving to a model of critical thinking and ‘praxis’ that offers little in this moment of potentially 
exceptional world-making opportunities and world-risking dangers. 
 
Thirdly, ongoing work in which this reviewer is engaged substantively attending to current 
processes of innovation, and particularly innovation attempting to respond to – and implicated in – 
the ‘world crises’, reveals a key strategic dynamic that is increasingly dominating the construction 
of a ‘new world’ in and through the crisis and demise of the ‘old’. This dynamic is one described 
previously by Foucault regarding prior system transitions in (and initiating) the Modern era; namely 
of the positive feedbacks amongst newly enabled forms of (particularly individual) liberty and 
autonomy on the one hand, and intense collective fears and ontological anxieties about system 
existential ‘security threats’ on the other. The interplay of these dynamics is complex and 
multifaceted – and too complex to explain in detail here. But the key point is that both ‘liberty’ and 
‘security’ must be understood not as abstract principles engaged in some sort of Platonic 
philosophical wrestle towards equilibrium of the legitimate concerns of each; but rather as 
shorthand for powerful and profoundly dynamic world-productive forces that feed off each other.  
Indeed these forces are ‘powerful’ precisely in their efficacy at mediating, and being mediated by, 
self-reinforcing practices of ‘innnovating’ new power/knowledge technologies, social relations, 
institutions, subjectivities and moral economies; i.e. in their dynamics of strategic relational world-
producing and system-shaping.  
 
Looked at through this lens, the world crisis reveals a completely different picture of ‘where we are’ 
and ‘what is happening’… and thus of ‘what should we do now?’ The daily headlines tell of 
deepening system crisis and increasing paralysis.  The incumbent (ecologically-dominant conditions 
within) systems continue to attempt to deploy their familiar forms of crisis management – 
programmes that simply exacerbate the problems – AND the emergence of a normatively desirable 
alternative remains despairingly slow.  But studying the ongoing construction of ‘future worlds’ 
through this lens reveals indeed the embryonic form of a new and dramatically qualitatively altered 
system (of systems). This emerging system, however, is profoundly normatively ambivalent and 
barely resembles the more utopian and Left-wing hopes that are currently proliferating. In 
particular, this ‘liberalism 2.0’ or ‘complexity liberalism’ manifests serious and significant efforts to 
tackle the most threatening aspects of the current crises. This would include low-carbon transitions, 
regulated global finance and new forms and institutions of ‘cosmopolitan’ geopolitics as well as, 
more profoundly, the emergence of new forms of government (in the Foucauldian sense) of techno-
science and innovation that are responsive to the fundamental challenges of dynamic complex 
systems. Yet these undeniably essential ‘advances’ also go hand-in-hand with new and newly 
legitimated forms of inequality that are all the more egregious for the self-righteousness of their 
complex ‘scientific’ defence, new systemic and collectively policed paranoias and self-reinforcing 
social exclusions, and possibly worsening environmental risks for the global majority. In short, they 
are irreducibly still within and driven by – hence ontologically inseparable from – a renewal and re-
settlement of global capitalism; albeit, of course, itself only a temporary one. This is the case not 
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least because of the utter domination of the key world-producing forces of innovation by capital vs. 
labour and their effectively total neglect by self-styled radical Left-wing ‘alternatives’.19 
 
Understood in strategic relational and complex systemic terms, however, this currently emerging 
future is also far from monolithic and, to the contrary, presents enormous strategic opportunities for 
a more ‘progressive’ system.  But this is so only insofar as the Left is prepared to engage with the 
profound rethinking of its epistemic-political self-conception described above; ironically in ways 
that parallel the rethinking of the epistemological presuppositions of classical liberalism 80+ years 
ago as neoliberalism was beginning to be formulated in the moment of its political nadir.20 For so 
long as it remains wedded to the familiar consolations of ‘emancipatory critique’, the Left will 
continue to concede the strategic initiative precisely to the far-from-dead – indeed, just emerging, 
really, across the majority world with their burgeoning ‘middle classes’ – forces of capitalist 
individualism. This epistemic reorientation is the immanent step of the critical and realist spirit that 
is now emerging in this moment of global crisis of globalizing power/knowledge systems. 
 
 
6. What do I do now? 
This leads, however, to one final point – that could possibly be understood as resonating with meta-
reality, but in ways not examined here. The priority for ‘critical’ forces in its reorientation to 
strategic, rather than explanatory/deconstructive, engagement with the present is a shift in primary 
focus of its moral gaze and purpose from the ‘objects’ of society or knowledge to the self (albeit in 
the world). For insofar as the latter remains, at best, secondary and thus unchallenged, the entire 
project of critical thought remains wedded – in practice, whatever its explicit pronounced position – 
to a conception of the ‘problem’ lying in the ‘object’ (whether this is the ‘world’, knowledge of it, 
or both), which is therefore necessarily to be ‘corrected’ by effortful, critical work and always ‘in 
due course’, after the thinking. Yet this is precisely to reaffirm the nature of the whole enterprise in 
ways that cannot reorient to a phronetic engagement of (critical) knowledge production with and 
within the dynamic strategic landscape of the rolling present; instead sending the critical scholar and 
activist back to the library and the committee room for literally endless and fissiparous abstract 
positioning and planning of the never-arriving future.  
 
Conversely, attending to the central question of ‘what do I do now?’ demands finally that one 
incorporates the crucial but (through Modernity) systemically overlooked dimension – and thereby 
systematically built up, hence the given predicament of (late) modern selves, including critical 
scholars like me – of the ‘I’ thus situated; the ‘I’ presented with this strategic, practical and ethical 
predicament and doing the thinking/doing. And this is a move that cannot be done in thought by the 
critical intellect, but only by the real mind/body (and indeed selves really and irreducibly techno-
socio-naturally situated and mediated).  For the latter certainly incorporates the former, but the 
former systematically aims to its own self-subsistence and completion in thought, denying its 
manifest dependence on the latter. It also thereby claims it is the self, rendering the self without 
particularity or substance, and so directing the gaze consistently away from itself back onto the 
‘object’, even as it remains in practice the most important locus producing contemporary socio-
natural worlds. As this entire confection – this problematic situatedness – is the product of the 
thinking (suffering, socio-technical, strategic) being, however, it is by reorienting our gaze to this 
broader self – and explicitly as not one’s (irreducible) critical cognition – that one can then allow 
the incremental but spontaneous emergence of realizations that may, in turn, afford a synthesis in 
practice of critical insights and perspectives, such as critical realism and deconstructive 
pragmatism, that are intrinsically incompatible in thought but equally compelling.  But here, then, 
the synthesis of critical insights is not achieved in thought nor even first and foremost pursued in 
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that particular realm of human action.  Or, to put it differently, the unity of theory and practice is 
not achieved in practice after first being achieved (even provisionally) in theory; it happens only 
ever in practice (of a concrete sociotechnical person), and hence according to criteria of practical, 
strategic, perpetually changing and lived coherence, not a durable and conclusive cognitive 
coherence that is somehow subsequently realized in practice. 
 
Moreover, turning the (critical) gaze on one’s own experience – and as a daily practice and ongoing 
process in the world through the cultivation of virtues, as in practices of mindfulness not just 
(endless cycles of) epistemic ‘reflexivity’ – thus: inevitably brings attention to what is the primary 
and most vivid and affective manifestation of the lived domain of being, which is what the critical 
scholar really wants to change; thereby inescapably, if slowly, reorients and resituates (undeniably 
crucial) practices of (critical) knowledge generation within their broader and primary goals in terms 
of what the scholar is actually doing; cultivates awareness and concern21  for the changing complex 
systemic and strategic reality in which the critical scholar actually lives, as opposed to that which 
s/he conjures for themselves in their comfort of their writings; and, crucially, manifests broader 
virtues, built upon a deepening appreciation of interdependence and care,22 imperfectability and 
constant change, that colour one’s reorientation from epistemic to strategic enterprise, so that this is 
not merely a shift to an ethically desiccated and self-serving opportunism.  
 
Finally, but by no means least, in the age of the Anthropocene and the global imperative of 
cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitical sensitivity, when human knowledges (techno-sciences and 
socio-technical interventions) have propelled themselves to a predicament in which it appears 
increasingly ‘common sense’, if still an insupportable and misconceived burden, that they are 
literally responsible for the world, this becomes an urgent ethical imperative.23 For only by taking 
such responsibility for the self – the absent and morally and ontologically unchallengeable puppet-
master of the Modern era, but also the primary locus of our default ontological commitments (of 
substantial and perfectible things) that are both profoundly held and lived, not merely thought, and 
fallacious – does humanity ultimately have any hope of not only achieving ‘living together well’ 
(with each other and with ‘nature’) but also of challenging the primary driver of the world crises to 
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